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THE READY-MADE GARMENT
INDUSTRY: AN ANALYSIS OF
BANGLADESH’S LABOR LAW
PROVISIONS AFTER THE SAVAR
TRAGEDY
INTRODUCTION
n April 24, 2013, a poorly constructed factory building in
Savar, Bangladesh collapsed, resulting in the deadliest
tragedy in the history of the garments industry.1 The disaster
killed 1127 workers and injured over another 2500.2 The eight-
story building, known as “Rana Plaza” housed several shops, a
bank, and five textile factories.3 The day before the collapse,
safety inspectors discovered cracks in the structure of the build-
ing.4 While its shops and bank shut down immediately, the own-
ers of the garments factories on the above floors ignored the haz-
ard warnings and demanded that their employees come in to
work. 5 An investigating committee, appointed by Bangladesh’s
Interior Ministry, found that Rana Plaza was constructed with
extremely substandard iron rods and cement and that the heavy
weight and vibrations of the garments manufacturing equip-
ment also contributed to the collapse.6 Moreover, the owner of
1. Jim Yardley, Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds
Widespread Blame, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-bangladesh-building-collapse-
finds-widespread-blame.html?_r=0.
2. Mark Lagon & Andrew Reddie, Bangladesh’s Lessons for Enlightened
Corporate Interest, GEO. J. INT’L AFF, (Aug. 5, 2013), http://jour-
nal.georgetown.edu/2013/08/05/bangladeshs-lessons-for-enlightened-corpo-
rate-interest-by-mark-p-lagon-and-andrew-reddie/.
3. Saeed Ahmed & Leone Lakhani, Bangladesh Building Collapse: An End
to Recovery Efforts, A Promise of A New Start, CNN (June 14, 2013, 5:17 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/14/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse-af-
termath.
4. Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh
Leaves Scores Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse.html?page-
wanted=all.
5. Manik & Yardley, supra note 4.
6. Bangladesh Factory Collapse Blamed on Swampy Ground and Heavy
Machinery, GUARDIAN (May 23, 2013, 1:52 PM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/may/23/bangladesh-factory-collapse-rana-plaza.
O
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the building, Sohel Rana, had illegally constructed two addi-
tional floors even though he was only authorized to build a six-
story structure under the official permit.7
While the Savar Tragedy has drawn widespread global atten-
tion, it is just one of many instances in recent years that high-
light the poorly regulated and unsafe working conditions in
Bangladesh’s Ready-Made Garments (“RMG”) industry.8 This
sector of the nation’s economy generates about $20 billion USD
annually and constitutes almost 80 percent of the nation’s ex-
ports.9 The RMG industry also employs four million workers in
over 5000 factories, most of whom are women.10 Currently,
Bangladesh is the second largest exporter of garments in the
world, behind China.11 In the past decade, the RMG industry in
Bangladesh has experienced rapid growth, especially because
the country has the lowest labor costs in the entire world.12 The
minimum wage for Bengali garments workers is only about $37
USD per month.13
7. Id.
8. Yardley, supra note 1; See infra notes 43–48.
9. Trade Information, BANGLADESH GARMENT MANUFACTURERS &
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (“BGMEA”),
http://www.bgmea.com.bd/home/pages/TradeInformation#.UliObBAgeMU
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
10. WTO Secretariat, Bangladesh: Trade Policies by Sector, WT/TPR/S/270
(Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s270-
04_e.doc; Trade Information, supra note 9; Ahmed & Lakhani, supra note 3.
11. Md. Mazedul Islam, Adnan Maroof Khan & Md. Monirul Islam, Textile
Industries in Bangladesh and Challenges of Growth, 2 RES. J. ENGINEERING
SCI. 31, 31 (2013).
12. Manik & Yardley, supra note 4.
13. U.S. DEP’T STATE: BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. & LAB,
BANGLADESH 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 38 (2012), http://www.state.gov/doc-
uments/organization/204607.pdf.
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Such low costs for labor have attracted major global clothing
retailers to outsource their garments production to Bangla-
desh14, including Wal-Mart,15 the Gap,16 Sears,17 Ralph Lau-
ren,18 H&M,19 and others.20 Particularly, corporate labels tied to
the factories in the Savar Tragedy include Wal-Mart, Mango,
Dutch retailer C & A, Benetton Fashions, Cato Fashions, and
the popular British chain Primark.21Due to worldwide pressures
for more corporate involvement in the protection of workers’
rights after the collapse in Savar, international labor organiza-
tions, NGOs, and major global retailers have negotiated a legally
binding agreement, known as the Accord on Fire and Building
Safety in Bangladesh,22 that obliges its clothing company signa-
tories to help finance safety inspections and building improve-
ments of RMG factories in the country.23
Moreover, in response to the disaster in Savar, the Bangla-
deshi government has also amended the Bangladesh Labour Act
14. Manik & Yardley, supra note 4.
15. See Promoting Responsible Sourcing in Bangladesh, WALMART,
http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/ethical-sourcing/promot-
ing-responsible-sourcing-in-bangladesh (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
16. See Bangladesh Update, GAP. INC., http://www.gapinc.com/con-
tent/gapinc/html/social_responsibility/bangladesh.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2013).
17. Scott Nova, Apparel Industry Outsourcing Costs Garment Workers’ Lives
in Bangladesh, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/13/apparel-industry-outsourcing-garment-
workers-bangladesh.
18. Christina Passariello, Tripti Lahiri & Sean McLain, What Do Armani,
Ralph Lauren and Hugo Boss Have in Common? Bangladesh, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (July 1, 2013, 8:54 AM), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424127887323998604578567522527553976.html.
19. SeeH&M,H&MCONSCIOUSACTIONS: SUSTAINABILITYREPORT 2013, at 21
(2013), available at www.hm.com/consciousactions2013.
20. Manik & Yardley, supra note 4.
21. Id.
22. ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH (May 13, 2013)
[hereinafter ACCORD], http://www.laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tions-and-resources/Accord_on_Fire_and_Building_Safety_in_Bangla-
desh_2013-05-13.pdf; Rashmi Venkatesan, Clothing Garment Workers in
Safety: The Case of Bangladesh, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. (July 13, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.epw.in/web-exclusives/clothing-garment-workers-safety-
case-bangladesh.html.
23. Steven Greenhouse,Major Retailers Join Bangladesh Safety Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/business/global/hm-
agrees-to-bangladesh-safety-plan.html?_r=1&.
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of 2006, in order to improve occupational health and safety in
the nation.24Under the new legislation, employees will no longer
need approval from factory owners to form unions, and factories
will be required to set aside 5 percent of their profits for an em-
ployee welfare fund.25 This Note argues that the new provisions
of the Bangladesh Labour Act are inadequate to combat the im-
mense violations within the country’s RMG industry and that
the Bangladeshi government should instead reform its labor leg-
islation by strengthening protections for trade unions, establish-
ing stricter penalties for noncompliance, and mandating the Ac-
cord on Fire and Building Safety as a minimum standard for cor-
porate responsibility, in order to effectively improve health and
safety conditions for its workers.
Part I of this Note will provide a detailed background of the
Savar Tragedy and will describe the current working conditions
in Bangladesh’s RMG factories. Part II will provide a critical
analysis of the amended provisions of Bangladesh’s Labour Act.
Finally, Part III will propose that, in order to effectively improve
the health and safety issues rampant in its RMG industry, Bang-
ladesh must provide more support for the creation of trade un-
ions, increase penalties for its labor law violators, and regulate
global retailers in its labor sector via obligatory participation in
the Accord on Fire and Building Safety.
I. THE SAVAR TRAGEDY ANDGENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE RMG
INDUSTRY
The tremendous loss of life resulting from the catastrophic
Savar Tragedy has left the citizens of Bangladesh, as well as the
international community, outraged and devastated.26While over
24. See Dui Hajar Tarrow Shonar Tereesh Nongbar Ayn [Bangladesh La-
bour Act (Act No. 30/2013)] [hereinafter 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act] trans-
lated in BANGLADESH GAZETTE (Uttam Kumar Das, 2013); ILO Statement on
Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (July 22, 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/statements-and-
speeches/WCMS_218067/lang—en/index.htm.
25. Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Bangladesh Passes New Labor Law: Workers
Granted More Leeway to Form Trade Unions, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 15,
2013, 1:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887323664204578607814136238372.
26. Thoughts On Savar Tragedy, EMERGING MARKETS ONLINE (May 10,
2013), available at 2013 WLNR 11618182.
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1200 people have been confirmed dead, the exact death toll re-
mains unknown, as several hundred bodies were brutally sev-
ered by, or buried within, the massive amounts of collapsed steel
and concrete.27 Civic groups buried over 230 unclaimed bodies in
a cemetery in the capital city of Dhaka.28 Rescue efforts spanned
twenty days of ceaseless digging through the rubble by soldiers,
firefighters, paramilitary police officers, and volunteer citizens
in search of survivors.29 For days, rescuers heard the screams of
people scattered within the wreckage, but were simply unable to
find many of them.30
In light of the disaster, the Bangladesh Garment Manufactur-
ers and Exporters Association (“BGMEA”) formed an eleven
member probe committee on April 28, 2013, to investigate the
causes of the collapse.31 The BGMEA, a trade body in Bangla-
desh, is known for forming taskforces and committees after ac-
cidents in the country’s RMG factories.32 After a two month long
investigation, the probe body, led by BGMEA Vice President SA
Mannan Kochi,33 submitted a 400-page report to the Bangla-
deshi government, disclosing its findings and recommenda-
tions.34 The report identified nine causes for the collapse, the key
cause being the illegal transformation of a government ap-
proved, six-story design into an industrial and commercial com-
plex that added several additional floors.35 Other causes identi-
fied in the report include the use of substandard quality building
27. Ahmed & Lakhani, supra note 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Manik & Yardley, supra note 4.
30. Ahmed & Lakhani, supra note 3.
31. BGMEA Probe Identifies Nine Causes of Savar Tragedy, NEW NATION
INDEP. DAILY (June 27, 2013), available at 2013 WLNR 15721046.
32. Sajjadur Rahman, Owners Probe Owners’ Fault: BGMEA Investigation
Always Comes to a Zero, DAILY STAR (May 1, 2013),
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/owners-probe-owners-fault/.
33. BGMEA Probe Identifies Nine Causes of Savar Tragedy, supra note 31.
34. Savar Collapse Probe Uncovers Abuses, DHAKA POST (May 24, 2013,
10:18 AM), http://www.thedhakapost.com/2013/05/24/savar-collapse-probe-un-
covers-abuses/; see also Yardley, supra note 1.
35. BGMEA Probe Identifies Nine Causes of Savar Tragedy, supra note 31.
The BGMEA investigation report is not available to the public. It was described
to journalists, and the main author agreed to an interview, but the actual doc-
ument has remained private. Email from Jim Yardley, South Asia Bureau
Chief of The New York Times, to author (Sept. 22, 2013, 2:00 PM) (on file with
author).
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materials, the installation of heavy machinery, and the inability
of Rana Plaza’s pillars to support a high load capacity.36
The Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology
(“BUET”), which examined samples from the wreckage collected
by the BGMEA probe committee, found that the structure of
Rana Plaza had a capacity of 2300 pounds per square inch
(“PSI”), which, for a six-story building alone, should have been a
minimum of 3500 PSI. 37 Given that Rana Plaza had two addi-
tional illegal floors, its capacity should have been even higher.38
The building was also overloaded with generators, boilers, gar-
ment machines, and air conditioning systems.39 The vibrations
of the machinery, as well as a massive stock of ready-made gar-
ments, raw materials for five different garment factories, and
the large number of workers situated on the factory floors fur-
ther contributed to the building collapse.40 Moreover, according
to Khandker Mainuddin Ahmed, the BGMEA probe committee
head, “a portion of the building was constructed on land which
had been a body of water before and was filled with rubbish.”41
The land itself had been “swampy with shallow water.”42
In its conclusive report, the BGMEA held Bangladeshi factory
inspection department officials responsible for issuing permits
to owners that enabled them to install heavymachinery and gen-
erators on floors that were unauthorized to be built in the first
place.43 Government and Savar municipality officials were also
36. BGMEA Probe Identifies Nine Causes of Savar Tragedy, supra note 31.
37. Id. “Pounds per square inch” is a unit of pressure; it measures one pound
of pressure per square inch. 4 HARRY M. PHILO ET AL., LAWYERS DESK
REFERENCE 9TH § 34:4 (10th ed. 2014).
38. BGMEA Holds Rana Plaza, 5 RMG Owners Responsible for Disaster,
Shirks its Responsibility, FIN. EXPRESS TRADE & MARKET (June 27, 2013),
http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/in-
dex.php?ref=MjBfMDZfMjdfMTNfMV85MF8xNzQzNTY.
39. BGMEA Probe Accuses Building, Factory Owners,DHAKATRIBUNE (June
26, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.dhakatribune.com/?q=node/5959.
40. BGMEA Probe Identifies Nine Causes of Savar Tragedy, supra note 31;
BGMEA Probe Accuses Building, Factory Owners, supra note 39.
41. Bangladesh Factory Collapse Blamed on Swampy Ground and Heavy
Machinery, supra note 6.
42. Id.
43. BGMEA Probe Identifies Nine Causes of Savar Tragedy, supra note 31.
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blamed for failing to oversee building compliance during the con-
struction phase and for approving blueprints.44 The report sug-
gested that these approvals were granted because Sohel Rana,
the building owner, had bribed local officials.45 The probe com-
mittee recommended to the government that Rana and the own-
ers of the five garment factories should be charged with life sen-
tences for culpable homicide.46 BGMEA President, Atiqul Islam,
has denied any liability on the Association’s part for the collapse
of Rana Plaza, stating that it “warned the factory and building
owners to shut it down a day ahead of the disaster.”47
Unfortunately, the Savar Tragedy is just one of several conse-
quences of a poorly regulated ready-made garments industry in
Bangladesh. While the incident in Savar killed 1127 people, the
RMG industry in Bangladesh has had at least 1800 deaths as a
result of fires and building collapses since 2005.48 Between 1990
and 2012, there were as many as 275 factory accidents in the
country.49 Just five months before Rana Plaza collapsed, a fire
in the Tazreen Fashions Garment Factory burned the building
to the ground, killing 112 people.50 In 2006, fifty-four workers
were burned alive in the KTS Garment Factory Fire.51 Another
disaster occurred in the 2005 Spectrum Sweaters Factory Col-
lapse, which killed over sixty people.52 Other tragedies include
44. Id.
45. Yardley, supra note 1.
46. Id.
47. BGMEA Probe Accuses Building, Factory Owners, supra note 39.
48. Bangladesh Factory Collapse Blamed on Swampy Ground and Heavy
Machinery, supra note 6.
49. Venkatesan, supra note 22.
50. Steven Greenhouse, Documents Reveal New Details About Walmart’s
Connection to Tazreen Factory Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/12/11/world/asia/tazreen-factory-used-by-2nd-walmart-sup-
plier-at-time-of-fire.html?_r=0.
51. How Bangladesh Garment Industry Traded Workplace Safety for Jobs,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2013, 7:04 AM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/05/23/bangladesh-garment-industry_n_3288266.html. Even
though the KTS’s managers admitted at trial that they had locked the gates of
the factory after the fire started in order to prevent theft by the employees,
they were still acquitted of culpable homicide charges. Id.
52. Id. No one was held accountable for this incident either, even though the
company had violated its building permit. Id.
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the Shifa Apparels and Omega Sweaters Fire in 2004,53 the
Garib & Garib Sweater Factory Fire in 2010,54 and the Condense
Apparel and Fahmi Factory Fire in 2011, among many others.55
Currently, RMG factories throughout Bangladesh are woefully
inadequate in terms of health and safety conditions. Factories
are created with substandard materials to save on construction
costs or are housed in buildings not built for industrial use.56 It
is common for RMG factories to lack sprinklers, fire alarms, ad-
equate emergency exits, nonelectrical emergency lights, and
firefighting equipment.57 Instead, workers are subject to flam-
mable materials in unprotected areas, overloaded electrical cir-
cuits, and other hazards.58 Emergency evacuation plans are
hardly implemented or nonexistent, directly contributing to
worker deaths or injuries.59 Almost no training is provided to
workers about safety procedures and emergency safety officers
are not appointed.60 Additionally, there are only about twenty
occupational health and safety inspectors for 50,000 registered
factories in the nation, which amounts to 2500 factories desig-
nated to each inspector.61 The RMG industry in Bangladesh is
growing so rapidly that it has outpaced the government’s ability
to monitor and enforce health and safety standards.62 But, at the
same time, the government has been willing to overlook the ram-
pant violations, which are outweighed by its monetary interest
in allowing the factories to continue operating.63
53. Aasha Mehreen Amin & Ahmede Hussain, Another Garment Factory
Tragedy: Could it have been Averted?, DAILY STAR (May 21, 2004), http://ar-
chive.thedailystar.net/magazine/2004/05/03/coverstory.htm.
54. Bangladesh Sweater Factory Fire Kills 21, CBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2010,
7:26 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/bangladesh-sweater-factory-fire-kills-
21-1.868604.
55. BJÖRN CLAESON, INT’L LABOR RIGHTS FORUM, DEADLY SECRETS: WHAT
COMPANIES KNOW ABOUT DANGEROUS WORKPLACES AND WHY EXPOSING THE
TRUTH CAN SAVE WORKERS’ LIVES IN BANGLADESH AND BEYOND 21 (Dec. 2012),
http://www.laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications-and-re-
sources/DeadlySecrets.pdf.
56. Venkatesan, supra note 22.
57. Id.; Claeson, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Venkatesan, supra note 22.
61. Claeson, supra note 55.
62. How Bangladesh Garment Industry Traded Workplace Safety for Jobs,
supra note 51.
63. Id.
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II. BANGLADESH’S 2013 LABOUR LAW AMENDMENTS
Following much international scrutiny after the Savar calam-
ity,64 including the suspension of Bangladesh’s trade privileges
by the United States,65 the Bangladeshi government officially
adopted eighty-seven new amendments to its 2006 Labour Act
on July 22, 2013.66 Noteworthy provisions include amendments
directly relating to workplace safety as well as sections concern-
ing trade unions and dispute resolution.67 Among the amended
safety measures are provisions that demand better regulation of
gangways and stairs, which are now required to be monitored
under closed-circuit cameras and remain open during business
hours.68 A clause has also been added to Section 78 of the 2006
Labour Act to require employers to provide personal safety
equipment and offer trainings for the mandatory use of such
equipment.69 Mandatory fire drills are now required every six
months in factories with fifty or more employees, rather than
just once a year.70
64. See Conclusions of the ILO’s High Level Mission to Bangladesh, INT’L
LABOUR ORG. (May 4, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/activi-
ties/statements-speeches/WCMS_212463/lang—en/index.htm; see also Joint
Statement by HR/VP Catherine Ashton and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De
Gucht Following the Recent Building Collapse in Bangladesh, European Com-
mission (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/in-
dex.cfm?id=894; see also Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, Statement by the U.S. Government on Labor Rights and Factory
Safety in Bangladesh (July 19, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2013/july/usg-statement-labor-rights-factory-
safety.
65. Statement by the U.S. Government on Labor Rights and Factory Safety
in Bangladesh, supra note 64.
66. See 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act.
67. See id. §§ 23–30, 48–52, 55–62. Other key new provisions include a stip-
ulation requiring 5 percent of annual profits to be deposited in a welfare fund
for workers, compulsory group insurance in factories employing at least one
hundred workers, and compensation for workers who die while in service after
continuous employment of at least two years. Id. §§ 10, 65, 99.
68. Id. § 24.
69. Id. § 25; Revised Bangladesh Labour Law ‘Falls Short’ of International
Standards – UN Agency, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 22, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45470#.UlpndxCzLi5.
70. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 23(d); Bangladesh Labour Act (Act No.
42/2006) [hereinafter 2006 Labour Act], § 62.
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In addition, Section 80 now directs factory inspectors to report
serious accidents to competent authorities, such as “the Govern-
ment, Fire Service, Directorate of Factories and Establishments,
[and] Police Station[s],”71 while Section 89 includes new subsec-
tions that mandate the establishment of a Health Center in fac-
tories of 5000 or more employees.72 If an employee develops an
occupational sickness or injury, employers must finance the cost
of treatment until the employee has fully recovered.73 Im-
portantly, a brand new provision has also been added, requiring
the formation of safety committees in factories with fifty or more
employees.74
Along with updates to safety procedures, the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment has also amended certain trade union regulations of its
2006 Labour Act.75 For instance, an amendment to Section 178
has eliminated a previous condition requiring the Director of La-
bor to submit to employers the names of union officers whenever
a new trade union is registered.76 Moreover, in order to form un-
ions, workers no longer need approval from factory owners, who
were previously allowed to veto union formations.77 Under the
amended laws, up to five unions can be formed within the same
factory, an increase from the previous maximum of two unions.78
With respect to collective bargaining, a clause has been added to
Section 202 of the Labour Act permitting workers to appoint out-
side experts to assist in their collective bargaining agreements.79
The right to strike has also been revised by the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment to require a two-thirds vote by a union’s membership,
71. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 26.
72. Id. § 28; ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, supra
note 24.
73. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 28.
74. Id. § 30; ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, supra
note 24.
75. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, §§ 48–52, 55–62.
76. Id. § 50; See 2006 Labour Act, § 178(3); Revised Bangladesh Labour Law
‘Falls Short’ of International Standards – UN Agency, supra note 69.
77. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Halfhearted Labor Reform in Bangladesh,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/half-
hearted-labor-reform-in-bangladesh.html; New Bangladesh Labor Law Disap-
points Rights Groups, UCA NEWS (July 17, 2013),
http://www.ucanews.com/news/new-bangladesh-labor-law-disappoints-rights-
groups/68776.
78. Al-Mahmood, supra note 25.
79. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 57; Revised Bangladesh Labour Law
‘Falls Short’ of International Standards – UN Agency, supra note 69.
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as opposed to the three-fourths voting prerequisite mandated by
the 2006 Act.80
The Bangladeshi government’s amendments to its 2006 La-
bour Act have introduced some positive changes to its RMG sec-
tor. For instance, the provisions regulating the mandatory use
of safety equipment, more frequent fire drills, and the obligation
of employees to report accidents to appropriate authorities may
ensure better monitoring of industrial mishaps and instill no-
tions of caution within the workplace environment.81 The provi-
sion requiring a Health Center in factories with over 5000 em-
ployees82 can also serve as a potentially useful measure, given
that workers in large, demanding establishments will now have
a nearby setting to receive medical assistance. However, despite
these slight improvements to the 2006 Labour Act, the new 2013
amendments present many weaknesses, especially for the RMG
industry. With respect to the new provisions related to safety
protocols, the International Labor Organization has expressed
concerns that further regulations must be implemented in order
to actually bring the 2013 amendments into practical effect.83
The International Labour Organization (“ILO”) recommends
that the next step for Bangladesh must be to focus on strength-
ening the government’s labor and safety inspection capacity and
developing necessary infrastructure.84
Certain amendments to the 2006 Labour Act, however, lack
substance entirely. For example, most of the Amendment to Sec-
tion 62, relating to fire exits, simply breaks down the previous
article in the 2006 Act into three shorter clauses, but does not
mandate anything that improves the use of these exits.85 While
80. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 59; 2006 Labour Act, § 211; Bangla-
desh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, HUMANRIGHTSWATCH (July 15, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/15/bangladesh-amended-labor-law-falls-
short.
81. See 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, §§ 23(d), 25, 26.
82. Id. § 28; ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, supra
note 24.
83. ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, supra note 24. In
addition to the ILO, the United Nations has also noted that “the amendments
do not prohibit discrimination in employment or remuneration, nor do they
prohibit debt bondage by children or compulsory labour as a form of punish-
ment.” Revised Bangladesh Labour Law ‘Falls Short’ of International Stand-
ards―UN Agency, supra note 69.
84. ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, supra note 24.
85. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 23; 2006 Labour Act, § 62.
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minor grammatical edits are understandable, such revisions
found throughout the Labour Act signify that only a portion of
the eighty-seven changes are of actual value to the improvement
of RMG conditions.86 While potentially substantive, there are
also certain provisions that are ambiguous. Particularly, the in-
sertion of Subsection 90(a), calling for the formation of safety
committees in factories with fifty or more employees is quite
vague.87 Human Rights Watch has referred to these committees
as “largely powerless bodies made up of management and work-
ers.”88 The Bangladeshi government has failed to properly define
the roles of these committees in the amendment that introduces
them.89
A number of Bangladesh’s Labour Act revisions relating to
trade unions are also problematic. Significantly, the Govern-
ment has made no changes to the requirement that 30 percent
of workers of an entire company must first join a trade union in
order for it to be registered.90 Prior to the adoption of the new
amendments, labor leaders urged Bangladeshi legislators to ac-
cept a 10 percent threshold for union formation instead.91 The
government’s refusal of these requests does not make unionizing
any easier, especially for apparel establishments with thousands
of workers, comprising many factories.92 Theoretically, the elim-
ination of a previous Labour Act stipulation that required the
Director of Labor to submit the names of union officers to em-
ployers can be considered as a beneficial reform for union mem-
bers.93 However, the practical effects of this revision are ques-
tionable. According to Babul Akhter, President of the Bangla-
desh Garment and Industrial Workers Federation, “In a country
where corruption is widespread, officials might give the list to
owners for bribes and [the union officers] might be fired from the
86. See 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act.
87. Id. § 30.
88. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, supra note 80.
89. Id.
90. 2006 Labour Act, § 179 (2); Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls
Short, supra note 80.
91. Steven Greenhouse, Under Pressure, Bangladesh Adopts New Labor
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013, http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/07/17/world/asia/under-pressure-bangladesh-adopts-new-la-
bor-law.html.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 50; 2006 Labour Act, § 178(3); See also Revised Bangladesh Labour
Law ‘Falls Short’ of International Standards – UN Agency, supra note 69.
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factory.”94 Moreover, even if the new legislation blocks employ-
ers from interference with unions, the Director of Labour still
maintains wide discretionary powers with regard to the regula-
tion of trade unions.95
Another shortcoming of the 2013 Labor Amendments is that it
does not change the stipulation that union leaders may only be
permitted to select their leaders from their own establishment.96
This is problematic because employers can fire these leaders if
they disapprove of their union involvement—or simply dislike
them—without good cause.97 The only amendment that comes
close to modifying this requirement is a provision that enables
public industrial sectors to elect 10 percent of union officials
from persons who are not employees in the establishment—a
provision that is completely irrelevant to private RMG facto-
ries.98Additionally, a union’s right to strike, a powerful economic
weapon for getting owners to meet workers’ demands, also re-
mains limited under the new laws, since a supermajority of the
union would still have to vote for the strike.99 The government
is also able to end a strike if it causes “serious hardship to the
community” or is “prejudicial to the national interest.”100
In addition to these disappointing changes in the 2006 Labour
Act, Bangladesh’s new amendments also completely fail to mod-
ify the few existing punishments for factory owners and other
culpable individuals,101 despite strong demands after the Savar
disaster for harsher punishments for health and safety viola-
tions.102 For example, according to the 2006 Act, the penalty for
94. New Bangladesh Labor Law Disappoints Rights Groups, supra note 77.
95. Al-Mahmood, supra note 25; 2006 Labour Act, § 179.
96. Id. § 180(b).
97. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 77; Bangladesh: Amended Labor
Law Falls Short, supra note 80.
98. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, § 52.
99. Id. § 59; 2006 Labour Act, § 211. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls
Short, supra note 80.
100. 2006 Labour Act, § 211; Greenhouse, Under Pressure, Bangladesh
Adopts New Labor Law, supra note 91.
101. Emran Hossain, Bangladesh’s Labor Reform Puts Profits Before Work-
ers, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/07/25/bangladesh-labor-reform_n_3653850.html.
102. Steven Greenhouse, U.S., Urging Worker Safety, Outlines Steps for
Bangladesh to Regain Its Trade Privileges, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/business/global/us-urging-worker-safety-
outlines-steps-for-bangladesh-to-regain-its-trade-privileges.html?_r=0; see
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failing to notify authorities of any accident which results in a
serious bodily injury is a fine of up to 1000 taka,103 which is
equivalent to about $12.66 USD.104 If the accident resulted in the
loss of life, the penalty for failing to report it is imprisonment of
up to six months, or a fine of up to 3000 taka105—approximately
$38.00 USD106—or both.107 Even relative to Bangladesh’s cur-
rent economy, these monetary penalties are quite low.108 For ex-
ample, the highest fine an RMG factory owner can receive for an
unreported incident, including a deadly one, is about the same
as the monthly minimum wage in the nation’s RMG sector.109
The nonmonetary punishments for labor law violations are weak
as well. For instance, the maximum sentence for a contravention
of the law by an act that results in the death of a worker is im-
prisonment for up to only four years.110
Moreover, the Labour Act and its amendments make no refer-
ence to other penal regulations under which RMG factory own-
ers may be held liable.111 For example, the Bangladesh Building
Construction Act, which “provide[s] for the prevention of hap-
hazard construction of buildings,”112 penalizes anyone who
“without the previous sanction of an Authorised Officer, con-
struct[s] or re-construct[s] or [makes an] addition or alteration
to any building.”113 While acts committed by RMG employers of-
ten coincide with these additional regulations,114 Bangladesh’s
also Chris Blake & Farid Hossain, Unidentified Victims of Bangladesh Col-
lapse Buried, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 1, 2013, 11:18 PM), http://big-
story.ap.org/article/toll-bangladesh-building-collapse-climbs-290.
103. 2006 Labour Act, § 290.
104. Treasury Reporting Rates of Exchange, BUREAU FISCAL. SERV., US DEP’T
OF TREAS. (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.fms.treas.gov/intn.html.
105. 2006 Labour Act, § 290.
106. Treasury Reporting Rates of Exchange, supra note 104.
107. 2006 Labour Act, § 290.
108. See generally World Development Indicators: Bangladesh, WORLDBANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (last visited
Nov. 8 2013).
109. BUREAU OFDEMOCRACY, supra note 13.
110. 2006 Labour Act, § 309.
111. See id.; See also 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act.
112. Building Construction Act, 1952 (Act. No. E.B. II/1953), as amended by
(1) E.P. Ord. No. IV of 1960, E.P. Ord. No. XIII of 1966, P.O No. 48 of 1972, Act
No. 12 of 1987, Act No. 35 of 1990.
113. Id. § 3.
114. 300 Bangladesh Garments Factories May Be Unsafe, CBS NEWS (June
13, 2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57589097/.
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labor laws do not discuss such alternative grounds for punish-
ment at all.115 Scattered legislation concerning related or poten-
tially applicable penalties may make employers in the labor in-
dustry, as well as the general public, oblivious to other respon-
sibilities the former may have under the law.
III. IMPROVINGHEALTH AND SAFETY CONDITIONS IN
BANGLADESH: A THREEFOLD SOLUTION
As a country where government failures and corruption run
rampant,116 Bangladesh must take major strides if it seeks to
improve conditions in its rapidly growing Ready-Made Gar-
ments sector. Weak to nonexistent government enforcement of
labor and safety laws in the nation enables employers to harass
and intimidate workers, as well as to ignore safety standards
with impunity.117 Additionally, RMG factory owners often have
strong political ties; a number of owners are members of parlia-
ment.118 In a country where government regulators favor those
with political clout, factory employers are able to escape legal
consequences for their violations.119 But, as the aforementioned
Labour Law and its amendments indicate, the labor sector in
115. See generally 2006 Labour Act; see generally also 2013 Labour (Amend-
ment) Act.
116. In 2012, Bangladesh ranked 144 out of 176 nations, ascending in order
from least to most corrupt, in Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2012 (2012), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs-
sets/2012_TI_CPI/$FILE/2012%20TI%20CPI.pdf. Between 2000 and 2005,
Bangladesh also topped the Corruption Perception Index for five consecutive
years as the most corrupt country in the world. Waliur Rahman, Bangladesh
Tops Most Corrupt List, BBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2005, 3:03 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4353334.stm.
117. Bangladesh: Tragedy Shows Urgency of Worker Protections, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/bangladesh-trag-
edy-shows-urgency-worker-protections. See How Bangladesh Garment Indus-
try Traded Workplace Safety for Jobs, supra note 51.
118. John Chalmers, Special Report: How Textile Kings Weave a Hold on
Bangladesh, REUTERS (May 2, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/05/02/us-bangladesh-garments-special-report-
idUSBRE9411CX20130502. Over thirty members of Parliament are employers
in the RMG industry, which accounts for about 10 percent of lawmakers in
Bangladesh. Additionally, at least half of Bangladesh’s parliament has busi-
ness connections of some sort. Id.
119. Id.
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Bangladesh is flawed at its very core, since basic labor legisla-
tion itself is rather weak. In order to begin improving the poor
health and safety conditions in its essential RMG industry, the
Bangladeshi government must first truly reform the very laws
governing its labor sector. This Note will now argue that new
legislation must be implemented in Bangladesh; legislation that
provides for the following: (1) increased protections for trade un-
ions (2) stronger penalties for labor violations and (3) more re-
sponsibility for global corporations through compulsory adoption
of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety.
A. Improving Trade Union Protections in Bangladesh
The Savar Tragedy, as well as past labor industry disasters in
Bangladesh,120 helps to vividly illustrate precisely how poor gov-
ernment oversight and law enforcement are within the nation.
With only about twenty safety inspectors in total,121 the govern-
ment clearly lacks adequate resources to properly regulate the
over 5000 factories in its RMG sector.122 In most developing
countries, like Bangladesh, social compliance monitors perform
examinations only about once a year, while government inspec-
tors may visit once every ten years.123 However, where govern-
ment officials fail, trade unions can help to fill in the gaps for
stronger labor safety standards.124 Unlike government labor de-
partments, trade unions also have better insight as to what spe-
cific workplace structure is best for each factory or establish-
ment, since they are formed by the employees themselves.
Unfortunately, in Bangladesh, the government has a notorious
reputation for suppressing trade union activity.125 As a result,
120. See supra notes 48–55.
121. Claeson, supra note 55; Bangladesh: Tragedy Shows Urgency of Worker
Protections, supra note 117.
122. WTO Secretariat, Bangladesh: Trade Policies by Sector, supra note 10;
Trade Information, supra note 9.
123. Lance Compa, After Bangladesh Labor Unions can Save Lives, WASH.
POST (May 26, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-26/opin-
ions/39544959_1_labor-unions-lance-compa-labor-relations.
124. According to Lance Compa, of the Cornell University School of Indus-
trial and Labor Relations, “a real trade union can provide the vigilance and
voice that workers need for sustained decency at their place of employment,
including a workplace that is not a death trap.” Id.
125. See Farid Hossain, Bangladesh to Allow Unions for Garments Workers,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 13, 2013, 1:24 AM), http://m.utsandi-
ego.com/news/2013/may/13/bangladesh-to-allow-unions-for-garment-workers/.
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collective bargaining in the country is very weak.126 According to
labor union organizers, Rana Plaza did not contain a single un-
ionized factory.127 If strong unions were supported by the gov-
ernment, the Savar Tragedy likely could have been prevented,
or at least resulted in fewer deaths, since workers would not
have felt threatened to come into work in the first place.128While
the new amendments to the 2006 Labour Act modified some reg-
ulations concerning trade unions,129 much stronger protections
are needed to solidify the presence and influence of union activ-
ity in Bangladesh.
First, forming a trade union must be made less difficult. The
Bangladeshi government’s failure to lower the 30 percent em-
ployee membership registration requirement continues to be a
major obstacle to workers’ ability to organize.130 The government
must remedy this by either following the suggestions of union
For instance, in 2010, Aminul Islam, an outspoken labor union organizer of the
Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity was arrested after leading protests
for a raise in the minimum wage. Later, he was allegedly tortured by police
and intelligence services. Id. He was again arrested in 2012 for recruiting pro-
testers for an anti-government demonstration. One month later, he was found
brutally murdered. Emran Hossain, Aminul Islam, Murdered Bangladeshi La-
bor Activist, Still Without Justice 14 Months After Death, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 22, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/22/animul-
islam-bangladesh-activist_n_3473603.html. Police did not take much action to
solve the murder, sparking international pressures for a thorough and inde-
pendent investigation. Julfikar Ali Manik & Vikas Bajaj, Killing of Bangla-
deshi Labor Organizer Signals an Escalation in Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/world/asia/bangladeshi-labor-or-
ganizer-is-found-killed.html?_r=0. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, is one such commentator. See Interview by Mooni Saha and Ejaj Ah-
med with Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, in Dhaka, Bangla-
desh (May 6, 2012), available at http://london.usembassy.gov/forpol127.html.
Still, today, the government has yet to solve the murder of Islam. See Bangla-
desh: Tragedy Shows Urgency of Worker Protections, supra note 117.
126. Hossain, supra note 101. According to a 2010 Labour Force Survey by
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, only about 3.88 percent of employees out
of the total workforce were members of trade unions. Kayes Sohel, The Right
to Form Trade Union? Not in RMG, DHAKA TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 2013, 2:53 PM),
http://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2013/aug/28/right-form-trade-union-
not-rmg.
127. Bangladesh: Tragedy Shows Urgency of Worker Protections, supra note
117.
128. Id. See also Sohel, supra note 126.
129. 2013 Labour (Amendment) Act, §§ 48–52, 55–62.
130. 2006 Labour Act, § 179 (2); Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls
Short, supra note 80.
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leaders and lowering the 30 percent threshold to 10 percent,131
parallel to the standard in India,132 or by revising the application
of the 30 percent threshold from a single establishment (i.e., an
entire garments company) to a single factory, as is the practice
in the United States.133 At the very least, the government should
meet union organizers halfway by lowering the minimum regis-
tration requirement to 20 percent of workers in an establish-
ment as a transitory start. Regardless, the 30 percent standard
must be modified in some way in order for more trade unions to
gain momentum in the RMG industry. Importantly, the govern-
ment should also enable workers in Export Processing Zones
(“EPZs”) to join unions as well, as they are barred from doing so
under the current law.134
However, changes that help to merely increase the number of
Bangladesh’s registered trade unions are not sufficient to em-
power them. The government must also amend the stipulation
in its Labour Act that prohibits trade unions from hiring outside
131. Greenhouse,Under Pressure, Bangladesh Adopts New Labor Law, supra
note 91.
132. India’s 2001 amendments to its Trade Union Act of 1926 modified the
minimum requirement for membership in a trade union to 10 percent of em-
ployees, or one hundred of them, whichever is less, subject to a minimum of
seven members. The Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2001, No. 31, Acts of
Parliament, 2001 (India), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/377818/.
Even though this change actually increased the threshold requirement for
forming a trade union, which, before the amendment, required membership of
just seven employees, India’s 10 percent minimum requisite or the one hun-
dred member alternative is still much easier to satisfy than Bangladesh’s
standard. The Trade Unions Act, No. 16 of 1926, INDIACODE (1926), http://pbla-
bour.gov.in/pdf/acts_rules/trade_unions_act_1926.pdf.
133. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 77. In the United States, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board governs the registration of trade unions. Conduct
Elections, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-
do/conduct-elections (last visited Jan. 18. 2014). To form a union, an election
petition must be filed with the nearest NLRB office, indicating that at least 30
percent of employees in a workplace are interested in registering. Id. If a peti-
tion is dismissed, an appeal can be filed within two weeks of the decision for
review by an attorney and a supervisor, and later, action by the actual Board.
Id. The NLRB then investigates to make sure it has jurisdiction, that the union
is qualified, and that there are no existing labor contracts that would bar a
representation election. Id. As an alternative path to registration, not subject
to the NLRB process, the NLRB also allows employees to persuade an employer
to voluntarily recognize a union after showing majority support. Id.
134. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, supra note 80.
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leaders,135 so that unions will not have to constantly worry about
their leaders being wrongfully fired by vengeful employers.136
Outside leaders can also be beneficial to unions, especially if
they are experts in the field. Since outside leaders are not em-
ployed in the affiliated establishment, they may also be able to
devote most of their time to union strategy and organization,
compared to those who are both full time RMG factory workers
as well as union leaders. Ultimately, the decision as to who
should lead a union should be left up to the members of that un-
ion and not limited by the government.
Additionally, the government must also cease its expansive
control over trade unions’ access to foreign funding.137Currently,
the Labour Act requires prior approval from the Labour and Em-
ployment Ministry before trade unions can receive “‘technical,
technological, health & safety and financial support’ from inter-
national sources.”138 Not only does this provision enable the gov-
ernment to maintain a “stranglehold over assistance to un-
ions,”139 it also violates Article 5 of ILO Convention No. 87, rati-
fied by Bangladesh in 1972,140 which stipulates that “workers’
and employers’ organisations shall have the right to establish
and join federations and confederations and any such organisa-
tion, federation or confederation shall have the right to affiliate
with international organisations of workers and employers.”141
As a party to this Convention, Bangladesh thus has the respon-
sibility to ensure that labor unions do not face limitations on
their right to freedom of association under international law.142
135. 2006 Labour Act, § 180(b).
136. See Halfhearted Labor Reform in Bangladesh, supra note 77.
137. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 80.
138. Id.; See 2006 Labour Act, § 178–79.
139. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, supra note 80.
140. Ratifications of C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INS
TRUMENT_ID:312232 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Revised Bangladesh La-
bour Law ‘Falls Short’ of International Standards – UN Agency, supra note 69.
141. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise art. 5, July 9, 1948, No. 87, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100
_INSTRUMENT_ID:312232.
142. ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, supra note 24.
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Another hindrance for trade unions that Bangladesh must re-
form is the large amount of discretion given to the Labour Direc-
tor when registering trade unions.143 The Labour Act permits
Bangladesh’s Director of Labour to deny workers authorization
to unionize if he is unsatisfied with their application.144 This au-
thoritarian condition merely reinforces the country’s history of
corruption.145 Labor activists worry that this provision will re-
sult in the Labour Director catering to powerful businessmen,
rather than workers who want to unionize.146 The problem,
though, can potentially be remedied in two ways. First, the gov-
ernment must pass new legislation mandating an independent
committee, appointed by the Labour Director, to administer
trade union registration. This way, the Director of Labor will
still maintain some power by being able to choose the members
of the committee—subject to impartiality requirements—but the
process of union approvals would be more democratic. Second,
Parliament must also pass an amendment, indicating that em-
ployees cannot be prevented from unionizing, once certain re-
quirements are met.147 With such a provision, a union’s fate will
not be left up to the complete discretion of one particular bureau-
crat.
Finally, Bangladesh must also help protect trade unions by ad-
justing its strict regulation of their right to strike. While the new
amendments to the 2006 Labour Act have eliminated the strict
three-fourths voting prerequisite necessary for union members
to strike, the current two-thirds voting requirement is still too
burdensome.148 Worker strikes, while often criticized as political
and disruptive,149 have been a major avenue for employees in
Bangladesh to protest violations by their employers, since they
usually have no other means of resolving disputes.150 A powerful
143. See supra p. 14 and note 95.
144. 2006 Labour Act, § 182(1); Hossain, supra note 101.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. This suggestion has been proposed by A. K. M. Nasim, senior legal coun-
selor at The Solidarity Center, an international labor rights group. Id.
148. See supra note 80.
149. Greenhouse,Under Pressure, Bangladesh Adopts New Labor Law, supra
note 91.
150. Celeste Drake, The AFL-CIO Reacts to Recently Passed Amendments to
the Bangladesh Labor Law of 2006, AFL-CIO (July 23, 2013),
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Global-Action/The-AFL-CIO-Reacts-to-Recently-
Passed-Amendments-to-the-Bangladesh-Labor-Law-of-2006.
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negotiation and leveraging tool for employers to meet workers’
demands,151 the right to strike should be fostered by requiring a
simple majority vote instead of a supermajority, as is the case in
the United States.152
Additionally, the government of Bangladesh should also mod-
ify the language of its labor laws in a manner that supports a
right to strike as opposed to a mere allowance. Currently, Bang-
ladesh’s Labour Act simply introduces the ability to strike by
stating that a party involved in a dispute “may” notify the other
party of a strike or lockout, provided that specified time condi-
tions are met153 as well as the aforementioned voting require-
ment.154 In contrast, the United States, in Section 13 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), stipulates, “Nothing in this
Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right.”155 Through the use of strong diction, the right to
strike, while subject to limitations, is expressly guaranteed by
the NLRA, and an emphasis is placed on its importance.156Bang-
ladesh should thus look to the language of the NLRA as a model
to establish striking as a critical right of trade unions by first
recognizing it in principle.
Furthermore, the legislature must also either remove or
clearly define the Labour Act stipulation that allows the govern-
ment to stop a strike if it would cause a “serious hardship to the
community” or is “prejudicial to the national interest.”157 This
provision only burdens a trade union’s right to strike, and
through ambiguous terminology, gives the government too much
power in determining whether or not the demonstrations may be
permitted.158 Finally, the Parliament in Bangladesh must
amend the 2006 Labour Act’s provision prohibiting new, foreign-
151. In 2006, worker strikes eventually resulted in a new minimum wage for
RMG industry workers, as well as other concessions. Nidhi Khosla, The Ready-
Made Garments Industry in Bangladesh: A Means to Reducing Gender-Based
Social Exclusion of Women?, 11 J. INT’LWOMEN’S STUDIES 289, 295 (2009).
152. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 77.
153. 2006 Labour Act, § 211(1).
154. See supra note 80.
155. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1935), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 100.
158. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, supra note 80.
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owned, or foreign-invested establishments from striking for a pe-
riod of three years after beginning production,159 because a
three-year restriction is far too onerous on the workers of the
many new establishments developing in Bangladesh’s booming
RMG sector.160
One noteworthy example of the benefits of better protections
for trade unions can be taken from the success of the United
States-Cambodia Textile Agreement (“UCTA”), which led to im-
provements in labor rights and standards in Cambodia’s RMG
industry.161 In 1999, the United States established a bilateral
trade agreement with Cambodia, which gave trade privileges to
Cambodia, if it brought its RMG sector into substantial compli-
ance with international labor standards, subject to third-party
monitoring by the ILO.162 One of the most significant improve-
ments in the nation was greater freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, as well as other protections, for unions.163 As
a result of these regulations, trade unions in Cambodia were
able to win more rights for their workers.164 During the span of
the UCTA, Cambodia’s garments exports to the United States
159. 2006 Labour Act, § 211 (8); Drake, supra note 150.
160. SeeManik & Yardley, supra note 4.
161. Don Wells, “Best Practice” in the Regulation of International Labour
Standards: Lessons of the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, 27 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 357, 361 (2006). Like Bangladesh, Cambodia is a poverty-stricken,
developing Asian country with a major RMG industry that accounts for 85 per-
cent of the nation’s exports. Countries Covered: Cambodia (The Kingdom of),
ILO, http://www.ilo.org/asia/countries/cambodia/lang—en/index.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2014).
162. John A. Hall, International Labor Standards: The ILO’s Better Factories
Cambodia Program: A Viable Blueprint for Promoting International Labor
Rights? 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 427, 429 (2010). Specifically, the Agreement
provided for the United States to increase Cambodia’s garments export quotas
when it made labor improvements. Wells, supra note 161, at 363–64.
163. Wells, supra note 161, at 369. Some other protections for unions in-
cluded a ban on firing union leaders without the consent of the Ministry of
Labour and mandatory reinstatement for such violations, “simplistic, demo-
cratic, and non-confrontational procedures” for recognizing unions, and the cre-
ation of labor arbitration council as a method for unions to resolve disputes.
Jonathan P. Hiatt & Deborah Greenfield, The Importance of Core Labor Rights
in World Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 39, 56 (2004).
164. Id. at 57. For instance, in November, 2003, the Solidarity Workers Un-
ion signed a collective bargaining agreement that improved safety standards,
work regulations, healthcare, and wages for its members at the Four Seasons
Garment Factory in Cambodia’s capital. Id.
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also increased fivefold, to a $1.9 billion USD industry.165 Alt-
hough the quota system for garments exports ended in 2005,166
the case of Cambodia indicates that increased quotas are not the
only incentive to strengthen labor standards and employee pro-
tections.167 Even after the UCTA expired, Cambodia was able to
maintain wage stability, and even increase employment and tex-
tile exports, by continuing to support better labor conditions.168
Notably, Cambodia’s reputation for high labor standards alone
has attracted many buyers to its RMG industry.169 The victories
of the Cambodian model, in which government regulations for
stronger trade unions played an important role in improving
workers’ rights,170 thus serves as an influential example of how
Bangladesh, too, could benefit from implementing better protec-
tions for unions.
B. Stricter Penalties for Noncompliance
In addition to strengthening protections for trade unions,
Bangladesh must also increase its penalties for labor violations,
particularly against employers, in order to improve conditions in
its RMG sector. In the case of the Savar Tragedy, despite the
massive labor law violations committed by building owner Sohel
Rana,171 the maximum penalty he could receive under the cur-
rent Labour Act is four years imprisonment, due to his contra-
vention of the law resulting in the loss of life.172 Such lax penal-
ties should not suffice for the individual chiefly responsible for
165. Wells, supra note 161, at 368.
166. Hall, supra note 162, at 429.
167. SeeWells, supra note 161, at 374.
168. Id.
169. Id. For example, the German ambassador to Cambodia has noted that
its labor standards were “of the utmost importance for the image of trading
partners in Europe.” Id. In addition, factories that were deemed more compli-
ant with international standards have been able to use ILO compliance reports
to attain contracts. Id. The World Bank has also indicated that buyers, in a
survey, have reported that labor standards compliance was one of the key fac-
tors in their determination to use Cambodian suppliers. See id.
170. See supra notes 162, 163, 164.
171. See supra notes 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 45.
172. 2006 Labour Act, § 309(1)(a); Hossain, supra note 101. Rana may also
face culpable homicide charges under section 304 of the Bangladesh penal code,
as recommended by a probe committee formed by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Mohosinul Karim, Rana Plaza Collapse: Probe Body Finds It A ‘Culpable Hom-
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one of the worst disasters in the history of the garments indus-
try.173 Stringent punishments are imperative because they serve
as strong deterrents for violators of safety regulations, thus pre-
venting deaths or serious injuries to workers.174
Accordingly, the government of Bangladesh must act to reform
penalties for labor violations in a number of ways. It must in-
crease penalties for health and safety code violations, which re-
sult in the loss of life, from a four year maximum to a ten year
minimum at the very least. Moreover, the alternative of a fine,
instead of imprisonment, for labor law violations with dangerous
results must be eliminated from those provisions under the La-
bour Act that allow them.175 The Bangladeshi government can
also benefit from adopting the penalty changes recommended by
the Obama Administration in its “Bangladesh Action Plan,” call-
ing for the nation to “increase fines and other sanctions, includ-
ing loss of import and export licenses, applied for failure to com-
ply with labor, fire, or building standards to levels sufficient to
deter future violations.”176 These alternative types of penalties,
such as the loss of import and export licenses, may be more in-
fluential in deterring employers from infringing health and
icide,’ DHAKA TRIBUNE (May 22, 2013, 5:58 PM), http://www.dhaka-
tribune.com/bangladesh/2013/may/22/committee-submits-report-rana-plaza.
But, even with a culpable homicide charge, the highest penalty that Rana may
receive under the law is ten years imprisonment for acts “done with the
knowledge that [they are] likely to cause death, but without any intention to
cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.” Bangla-
desh Penal Code (Act. No. 45/1860), § 304.
173. See Hossain, supra note 101.
174. This recommendation derives support from the deterrence theory of
punishment, which postulates that “perpetrators should suffer punishment in
order to—and to the extent needed to—discourage the commission of further
criminal harms and thus produce the greatest good for the greatest number.”
SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, HOW CRIMINAL LAW WORKS: A CONCEPTUAL AND
PRACTICALGUIDE 39 (2009). The theory holds that individuals will refrain from
certain activities that may be advantageous or beneficial to them personally “if
they know that they will suffer greater pain as a consequence.” Id. at 40.
175. 2006 Labour Act, § 309(1)(a)-(b).
176. Statement by the U.S. Government on Labor Rights and Factory Safety
in Bangladesh, supra note 64; see Greenhouse, U.S., Urging Worker Safety,
Outlines Steps for Bangladesh to Regain Its Trade Privileges, supra note 102.
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safety codes because they come with long-term consequences, as
opposed to minor, one-time fees.177
Higher fines for violations that do not result in the loss of life
are necessary as well, given that the current maximums are far
too low, even relative to Bangladesh’s economic standards.178
The government must amend its current labor laws to increase
fines for major health and safety code violations to monetary
amounts that are equivalent to the violator’s entire annual sal-
ary, which is likely to have a more dramatic impact on their will-
ingness to take risks with the laws. In addition, the government
should also revise its current Labour Act to explicitly reference
other punishments under regulations related to health and
safety, such as penalties under the Building and Penal codes, so
that labor industry employers as well as the general public are
better aware of the different types of penalties that may be ap-
plicable to violators.
C. Mandating Corporate Adoption of the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety
Lastly, in order for Bangladesh to better reform its current la-
bor regulations, it should mandate all major corporate retailers
sign the Accord on Fire and Building Safety via an amendment
to its current Labour Act. The Accord, signed on May 13, 2013,
is a legally binding contract between international retailers and
international and Bangladeshi trade unions that requires the
implementation of reasonable health and safety measures in
Bangladesh’s RMG industry for a period of five years.179 The
177. Although the U.S. sanctions have already ended, taking the Obama ad-
ministration’s recommendations and other diplomatic pressures into consider-
ation can be advantageous to Bangladesh from a general, foreign policy stand-
point. Such deference indicates the willingness of the country to accept advice
from fellow states, which would make Bangladesh a more desirable partner in
other international affairs.
178. See supra notes 13, 109.
179. Accord, supra note 22, at 1. Major trade unions that are parties to the
agreement include IndustriALL and UNI Global. Moreover, a number of non-
governmental organizations, such as Clean Clothes Campaign, Workers’
Rights Consortium, and International Labour Rights Forum are witnesses to
the agreement. BANGLADESHACCORD FOUNDATION, FAQs, ACCORD ON FIRE AND
BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/faqs/ (last
visited Dec. 26, 2013). These NGOs are signatories to a Joint Memorandum to
the Accord, stating their intent to support the implementation of the agree-
ment’s fire and building safety program. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 1.
710 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:2
agreement was executed just weeks after the Savar building col-
lapse, in response to intense international pressure from labor
and political groups on clothing retailers to take more responsi-
bility in ensuring better safety standards within Bangladeshi
factories.180
The Accord on Fire and Building Safety covers over two million
workers and more than 1600 factories in the nation.181 So far,
over one hundred international brands with suppliers in Bang-
ladesh have signed the Accord, including various popular Euro-
pean and American companies, such as H&M, Primark, Tesco,
C & A, Abercrombie and Fitch, Adidas, Esprit, Marks and Spen-
cer, Mango, and Puma, among others.182 The signatories have
also expressly agreed to coordinate their programs with Bangla-
desh’s National Action Plan on Fire Safety (“NAP”), an earlier
agreement established by Bangladesh’s Ministry of Labour and
Employment (“MoLE”) in conjunction with RMG employers and
workers for the improvement of fire safety.183
180. See Steven Greenhouse, Major Retailers Agree to Inspection Standards
in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/11/21/business/international/major-retailers-agree-to-inspec-
tion-standards-in-bangladesh.html. The Accord was also a culmination of pre-
vious efforts and negotiations between labor groups and for-profit companies
to create a “multi-stakeholder mechanism for fire and building safety” since
the Garib and Garib Sweater factory fire in 2010. Venkatesan, supra note 22.
181. Safety Accord Welcomes 100 Brand Milestone, INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL
UNION (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.industriall-union.org/bangladesh-safety-ac-
cord-welcomes-100-brand-milestone.
182. Id. For a full list of official signatories, see BANGLADESH ACCORD
FOUNDATION, Signatories, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN
BANGLADESH SIGNATORIES, http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2013).
183. The NAP was established following the Tazreen Fashions Fire as well
as the Smart Export Garments Fire, just five and three months, respectively,
before the Savar collapse. A tripartite committee, chaired by Secretary of the
MoLE, was established and met several times, with assistance from the ILO,
to implement a Plan of Action to promote building safety standards. MINISTRY
LAB. & EMP., NATIONAL TRIPARTITE ACTION PLAN ON FIRE SAFETY FOR THE
READY-MADE GARMENT SECTOR IN BANGLADESH (Mar. 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia/—-ro-bangkok/—-ilo-
dhaka/documents/genericdocument/wcms_221543.pdf; ACCORD, supra note 22,
at 1.
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1. Benefits of the Accord
There are a number of reasons why Bangladesh’s RMG indus-
try can benefit from the provisions of the Accord. First, unlike
the current labor regulation structure of the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment, under which the Director of Labour and Chief Inspec-
tor exercise broad powers,184 the Accord maintains a fairer gov-
ernance system.185 It is administered by a Steering Committee
(“SC”), equally represented by the companies and trade unions
that are parties to the agreement, holding a maximum of three
seats each, as well as a representative from the ILO, as a neutral
chair.186 The Steering Committee is responsible for the selection
and review of a Safety Inspector and Training Coordinator, over-
sight and approval of the Safety Program’s budget, and other
management duties “as may be required.”187
Second, the Accord also provides for rigorous inspections of
RMG factories,188 under the direction of an independent and ex-
perienced Safety Inspector, whom the SC appoints.189 Under the
SC’s current agenda, initial inspections to identify the most nec-
essary repairs are to be completed by October, 2014.190 These in-
spections involve investigating hazards that are “grave and im-
mediate risks to workers,” such as inadequate evacuation proce-
dures, faulty emergency equipment, and infrastructure.191 If an
inspection determines that an RMG factory building is unsafe
and imminently threatens worker safety, the relevant authori-
ties shall be notified.192 The owner of the factory must then sus-
pend all operations and take corrective action, as identified by
the Inspector, to bring the building into compliance with the
proper safety standards.193 Notably, even while manufacturing
is suspended for building renovations, the Accord requires that
184. 2006 Labour Act, §§ 317−18.
185. See ACCORD, supra note 22, at 2 for the Accord’s governance provision.
186. Id. Again, government protections for trade unions are critical since
these unions serve important roles under the Accord.
187. Id.
188. Greenhouse, Major Retailers Join Bangladesh Safety Plan, supra note
23.
189. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 3.
190. BANGLADESH ACCORD FOUNDATION, supra note 182.
191. Committee Firms-up Plan to Apply Bangla Fire Safety Accord, GLOBAL
DATA POINT, July 8, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 17016243.
192. See BANGLADESH ACCORD FOUNDATION, supra note 182.
193. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 4.
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companies continue to employ and pay their workers regular
wages for a period of up to six months.194
In contrast to the Bangladeshi government’s inspection sys-
tem, where a minimal number of inspectors perform sporadic ex-
aminations of RMG factories,195 the Accord’s “Credible Inspec-
tions” provisions are more practical and effective because they
require safety personnel, acting under the direction of the Chief
Inspector, to perform inspections of every factory covered by the
agreement within a reasonable and a narrow timeframe.196 Ad-
ditionally, an Inspector who is wholly independent and chosen
by both companies and labor unions with equal decision-making
powers197 also helps to assure that findings will not be biased
toward one particular group. Moreover, the Accord also calls for
transparency by requiring the Safety Inspector to complete writ-
ten inspection reports of all factories within two weeks of the
inspection date.198 These reports must be submitted to the SC,
the worker representatives, the signatory companies, factory
management, and each factory’s individual safety committees.199
The Safety Inspector must also disclose these reports to the gen-
eral public within six weeks, along with remediation plans for
the factories, if any.200
Another major benefit of the Accord on Fire and Building
Safety is its dispute resolution system. According to its provi-
sions, any disputes between the parties must first be submitted
to the SC for a majority vote decision.201 This decision can then
be appealed to a process of final and binding arbitration gov-
erned by the New York Convention.202 Prominently, any arbitra-
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 121–23.
196. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 3–4.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. The New York Convention, formally known as the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
is known as “the most significant contemporary legislative instrument relating
to international commercial arbitration” since it provides somewhat of a “uni-
versal constitutional charter” for the process of international arbitration.
BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S.WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (6th ed. 2011).
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tion award will be enforceable in the domestic courts of the coun-
try of the signatory against whom the enforcement is sought.203
Since domestic courts generally have a broad obligation to en-
force foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention,204
the dispute resolution system set up by the Accord can serve as
a useful and effective settlement process for the parties to the
agreement.
Most importantly, the Accord requires the corporate buyers,
who are parties to the agreement, to finance the execution of its
provisions—not trade unions or the government.205 Funding by
these retailers includes two categories of costs: administration
expenses and additional safety improvements.206 Administrative
costs are those that fund safety inspections, training, and other
operations of the Accord’s program.207 Funding for these activi-
ties is based on a sliding scale that is proportional to “the annual
volume of each company’s garment production in Bangladesh
relative to the respective annual volumes of garment production
of the other signatory companies, subject to a maximum contri-
bution of $500,000 [USD] per year. . . .”208 Significantly, compa-
nies to the Accord are also responsible for making sure that ad-
equate funds are available to pay for repairs and other types of
renovations suggested by the Safety Inspector.209
The Accord on Fire and Building Safety also incentivizes sup-
pliers to comply with the standards and activities it sets out,
203. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 2.
204. See CARTER &WEINER, supra note 202, at 359. The New York Conven-
tion has resulted in a generally pro-enforcement legal regime for international
arbitral awards. See id. Several prominent cases have demonstrated that U.S.
Courts will uphold an arbitration court’s decision, even against a U.S. company
and in favor of another nation, in order to abide by the Convention. See Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding a foreign arbitral award in
favor of an Egyptian corporation and rejecting the defenses of a U.S. company
for breach of contract); see also National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733
F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1990) (upholding an international arbitral award against
a U.S. oil corporation in favor of a Libyan national oil company).
205. Venkatesan, supra note 22.
206. BANGLADESH ACCORD FOUNDATION, supra note 182.
207. Id.
208. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 6.
209. Funding does not necessarily have to be direct payment by retailers. It
can also include money generated through negotiated commercial terms, joint
investments, or contributions from government grants and other donor sup-
port. BANGLADESH ACCORD FOUNDATION, supra note 182.
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since failure to do so may lead to the termination of the business
relationship between the RMG supplier and the corporate re-
tailer.210 Given that the Accord is a five-year binding contract, it
also ensures that companies cannot simply take their business
interests elsewhere.211 By adopting the agreement, the signatory
companies demonstrate that they will maintain a long-term
sourcing relationship with Bangladesh,212which helps to provide
a sense of security for the country’s RMG workers.
2. The Necessity for a Compulsory Accord
While the Accord strives to reform conditions in RMG factories
in Bangladesh in a practical and comprehensive manner, a key
issue with the agreement is that a company’s decision to become
a party to the agreement is completely voluntary.213 As a result,
numerous massive corporate retailers have refused to sign the
agreement, despite intense international pressures to do so.214
One such company is Wal-Mart. Along with twenty-five other
mainly American brands, such as the Gap and Target, certain
companies have created their own agreement to deal with safety
inspections, known as the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker
Safety (“Alliance”).215 The Alliance’s plan involves providing low-
interest loans for safety improvements, inspections of factories
to be performed within a year, and a hotline for workers to report
concerns.216
However, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety is rela-
tively weak, when compared to the Accord on Fire and Building
Safety, for a number of reasons. Prominently, unlike the Accord,
the Alliance is not legally binding.217 In addition, the Alliance’s
210. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 5.
211. BANGLADESH ACCORD FOUNDATION, supra note 182.
212. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 6.
213. Venkatesan, supra note 22.
214. Id.
215. Steven Greenhouse, Europeans Fault American Safety Effort in Bangla-
desh, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/busi-
ness/international/europeans-fault-american-safety-effort-in-bangla-
desh.html?_r=0.
216. Accord, Alliance, or Disunity, ECONOMIST (July 13, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21581752-transatlantic-divide-
among-big-companies-may-hinder-efforts-improve-workers-safety.
217. BANGLADESH ACCORD FOUNDATION, supra note 182; Greenhouse, Euro-
peans Fault American Safety Effort in Bangladesh, supra note 215; Accord,
Alliance, or Disunity, supra note 216.
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governance structure does not include an official role for worker
representatives, and companies that are parties to it are only
required to pay administrative costs, but unobligated to contrib-
ute funding for building and infrastructure repairs.218 The Alli-
ance has been criticized by various labor rights groups, including
the AFL-CIO, which has released a statement that notes, “Ra-
ther than sign[ing] the binding Accord, Walmart and Gap are
pushing a weak and worthless plan that avoids enforceable com-
mitments.”219 Thus, given that the Accord involves strong, sub-
stantive, and binding obligations on its parties,220 it is impera-
tive for the Bangladeshi government to mandate that all major
retailers seeking to outsource from Bangladesh’s RMG suppliers
sign this agreement.
Government legislation that mandates the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety is critical for a number of reasons. First, requir-
ing adherence to this one particular agreement allows for a uni-
form process of regulation by companies that employ Bangla-
deshi workers. If all major retailers are subject to the Accord,
factories that are associated with them will maintain similar
and consistent standards for workplace safety, as opposed to reg-
ulations that may vary greatly based on different models. In ad-
dition, the Accord’s commitment to transparency and reporting
ensures that all groups involved in the RMG industry, from fac-
tory owners and companies to workers and unions, as well as the
general public, are well aware of the corrections that must be
made to health and safety standards. 221 The fact that signatories
218. Understanding the Alliance and the Accord on Bangladesh Worker
Safety, OXFAMAUSTRALIA (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.oxfam.org.au/2013/12/un-
derstanding-the-alliance-and-the-accord-on-bangladesh-worker-safety/.
219. Jacob Davidson, Walmart’s Worker-Safety Plan Draws Ire of Labor Ac-
tivists, TIME WORLD (July 11, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/07/11/wal-
marts-smokescreen-worker-safety-plan-draws-ire/.
220. Benjamin Hensler & Jeremy Blasi, Making Global Corporations’ Labor
Rights Commitments Legal Enforceable: The Bangladesh Breakthrough,
WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (June 18, 2013), http://www.cleanclothes.org/re-
sources/recommended-reading/making-global-corporations2019-labor-rights-
commitments-legally-enforceable-the-bangladesh-breakthrough/view.
221. In addition to publicized inspection reports, the Accord requires compa-
nies to release an aggregated list of all of their suppliers in Bangladesh, called
a Quarterly Aggregate Report, as well as a public statement from the Safety
Inspector identifying any factory that does not comply with his or her recom-
mendations in a timely manner. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 5. The Accord Foun-
dation is also active on social media. It maintains a website that explicates the
stipulations of the agreement and provides news updates on its progress. See
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to the Accord are responsible for funding its program and any
improvements that may be necessary222 also takes financial bur-
dens off of the Bangladeshi government. The country, after
Savar, can now support additional and rigorous inspections
without significant costs to itself. Since the Accord explicitly pro-
vides for coordination with Bangladesh’s National Action Plan,
the government need not worry that the agreement’s program
may conflict with its own regulatory measures.223 Finally, gov-
ernment legislation that mandates the Accord for all major
brands and retailers implicates Bangladesh’s recognition of the
need for genuine corporate responsibility in the RMG sector.
3. Implementing a Mandatory Accord
Of course, concerns may arise as to whether or not a universal
mandate for corporate responsibility via the Accord can be prac-
tically implemented. In other words, why would companies
choose to comply with a binding agreement, rather than take
their business elsewhere? There are a number of reasons for
this. First, corporations have an “obvious economic interest” in
making sure that their employees are safe.224 The necessary se-
curity and other expenses of the Accord can be considered inex-
pensive when compared to the larger costs of replacing factories,
goods, and equipment if an industrial disaster ensues due to in-
adequate maintenance and safety policies—as in the case of
Savar.225 If companies keep ignoring their duty toward better
oversight, these costs will accumulate no matter where they go.
Economic losses are also linked to reputational costs that com-
panies will incur if they choose to remain inactive or object to a
uniform approach to safety in Bangladesh’s RMG sector (i.e., the
Accord), in preference for their own policies. Even if a company
simply relocates to a different developing nation after Savar or
another disaster in Bangladesh, it will still lose business due to
public outcry over its corporate negligence and failure to remedy
ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http://www.bangla-
deshaccord.org/, (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). It is even active on Twitter. Bang-
ladesh Accord, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/bangaccord, (last visited Dec. 29,
2013).
222. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 6; Venkatesan, supra note 22.
223. ACCORD, supra note 22, at 1; see supra note 130.
224. Lagon & Reddie, supra note 2.
225. See id.
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its involvement.226 Moreover, there has already been negative
international press associated with companies that have turned
away from the Accord in favor of other policies, such as the Alli-
ance, so it would behoove retailers to adopt the approach that
has garnered the most positive momentum.227
While implementing a mandatory Accord may be challenging,
it is nonetheless a reasonable and realistic option. Over one hun-
dred companies have progressively signed on to the agreement228
and, with additional pressure, more can be swayed to do so. Fur-
thermore, the Bangladeshi government maintains much lever-
age over international retailers with its “cheapest-in-the-world”
labor.229 Even after the Savar Tragedy, business in Bangladesh’s
RMG sector is booming, and retailers continue to outsource work
to the country.230 Companies that are heavily invested in Bang-
ladeshi’s RMG industry may comply with the Accord out of fear
that they would not be able to find a similarly inexpensive labor
source.231 Ultimately, it is more reasonable, efficient, and cost-
effective for international retailers to give in to joining the Ac-
cord than to find employees elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
The poor labor standards in Bangladeshi factories, especially
after the devastating effects of the Savar Tragedy, illustrate that
improvements in Bangladesh’s Ready-Made Garments industry
are imperative. To ensure better safety conditions for RMG in-
dustry employees, Bangladesh must reform its weak labor laws.
Better labor provisions are needed to protect trade unions, so
that the unions may rise from their current suppressed position
and effectively protect workers’ rights through collective bar-
gaining. The country’s weak penalties for labor violations also
226. Id.
227. See supra note 221.
228. Safety Accord Welcomes 100 Brand Milestone, supra note 181.
229. Manik & Yardley, supra note 4.
230. Bangladesh’s Clothing Industry: Bursting at the Seams, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21588393-workers-
continue-die-unsafe-factories-industry-keeps-booming-bursting-seams.
231. Bangladesh’s labor wage is half of India’s and less than a third of China’s
and Indonesia’s. Hussian Zahid, Bangladesh: The Next China?, WORLD BANK
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/bangla-
desh-next-china. Bangladesh is also superior to other nations in terms of its
RMG sector’s scale, with over twice as many factories as Vietnam and Indone-
sia. Bangladesh’s Clothing Industry: Bursting at the Seams, supra note 230.
718 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:2
indicate that new legislation should be geared toward severe de-
terrence measures that exact harsher penalties for noncompli-
ance. While Bangladesh’s attempts to address its labor sector is-
sues in response to Savar have been unsatisfactory, the Accord
on Fire and Building Safety provides hope for safer Bangladeshi
factories in the future. The country must, therefore, act quickly
to take advantage of the Accord by making the agreement com-
pulsory for all companies that seek to benefit from the nation’s
rapidly growing RMG sector. Through enhanced legislation,
which requires the participation and coordination of the govern-
ment, trade unions, employers, and corporate retailers, Bangla-
desh can ensure a multitude of avenues to promote the safety of
RMG workers, so that disasters like Savar can be prevented
from ever happening again.
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